Grounds That Can Make a Prenup Unenforceable
Family Code section 1615(a) lists two grounds, and the spouse resisting the agreement carries the burden of proving one of them.
Ground one: the agreement was not signed voluntarily
The first ground is stated plainly: "That party did not execute the agreement voluntarily." In everyday terms, voluntary means the spouse signed by free choice, with real time and real access to advice, rather than under pressure.
The statute does not leave "voluntary" to guesswork. Section 1615(c) says an agreement is deemed not executed voluntarily unless the court finds, in writing or on the record, all of the following:
- The resisting party was represented by independent legal counsel at signing, or, after being advised to seek independent counsel, expressly waived that representation in a separate writing. The advisement to seek counsel must be made at least seven calendar days before the final agreement is signed.
- A seven-day review period was met. For agreements signed between January 1, 2002, and January 1, 2020, the party had at least seven calendar days between first being presented with the final agreement and advised to seek counsel, and signing. For agreements signed on or after January 1, 2020, the party had at least seven calendar days between first being presented with the final agreement and signing, "regardless of whether the party is represented by legal counsel." Nonsubstantive amendments that do not change the terms are excluded.
- If unrepresented, the party was fully informed of the terms and basic effect of the agreement and the rights being given up, was proficient in the language of both the explanation and the agreement, received that explanation in writing before signing, and signed a document declaring who provided the information.
- The agreement and those writings were not signed under duress, fraud or undue influence, and neither party lacked capacity to contract.
- Any other factors the court deems relevant.
Because the date of signing determines which version of the seven-day rule applies, the date on the agreement matters a great deal in a San Diego enforcement dispute.
Ground two: unconscionability at signing, combined with a disclosure failure
The second ground has several parts, and all of them must be shown. The resisting party must prove the agreement "was unconscionable when it was executed" and that, before signing, all of the following applied:
- "That party was not provided a fair, reasonable, and full disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the other party."
- That party did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, any right to further disclosure.
- That party did not have, or reasonably could not have had, an adequate knowledge of the other party's property or financial obligations.
Disclosure, in this context, means telling the other spouse what you owned and what you owed before signing: accounts, real estate, business interests, retirement holdings, income, loans and other debts. The statute pairs a disclosure failure with unconscionability at signing; a thin disclosure on its own does not meet this ground if, for instance, the other spouse already had adequate knowledge or waived further disclosure in writing.
Who decides unconscionability
Section 1615(b) says unconscionability "shall be decided by the court as a matter of law." A question of law is one the judge resolves, applying the legal standard to the facts in the record. In a San Diego County family case, that means the judge hearing the dissolution decides whether the agreement, or a support term under section 1612(c), crosses the line.
Each ground stands on its own facts. The documents, the dates and the people involved at signing are what a court reviews, and no single ground is described here as more or less likely to succeed.